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This paper will focus upon American foreign policy dur-
ing World War II. More specifically, it will examine the
military and political cause-effect relationship of great
power authority as it was practiced by the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Great Britain at the Teheran and Yalta
summit conferences. The main thrust of the discussion is
intended to examine the belief that:
American wartime diplomacy was complicated by the
lack of clear distinction between diplomacy as such
concerning political matters and decisions of mili-
tary policy, the latter frequently being made ;tfith-
out consideration of their political implications -,
or their possible effects on postwar foreign policy.
In short, the primary issues will revolve about the inter-
action of political and military decision-making processes
attendant to the conduct of great power summits.
The term "great power" can be defined as a state that
"must be able to maintain itself (in war) against all others,
2
even when they are united...". In this context it has been
said of great powers that:
(1) ...Great Power decisions occur within the context
of war and war emergencies...
(2) ...Great Power decisions... £arej ...character-
istically shortsighted. ...Crisis situations tend to
Ruhl Bar tie tt, Policy and Power: Two Centuries of
American Foreign Relations (New York: Hill and Wang, 19~6"3)
,
p. 202.
2 George Modelski, Principles of World Politics (New
York: Free Press, 1972), p. 11+2.

foreclose alternatives and direct attention to
military matters at the expense of long-range
considerations favoring world order. ...The short-
sightedness of these decisions is attributable to
the exigencies of war;yet, inasmuch as war is linked
directly to Great Power status and to its exercise,
it also becomes an element of structural weakness
in the entire system.
(3) The immediate costs of Great Power decisions
are usually borne by the smaller states that are
affected by them rather than by the Great Powers
themselves. ...As long as the concessions could
be made at the expense of others, the Great Powers
have tended to slide into poorly conceived settle-
ments that are {"effective in producing order, but
which arej generally also unjust. ->
This pejorative description of the nation-state's performance
as primary actor in the conduct of international relations
may or may not be deserved. However, it does bring to center-
stage the important subject of military decision-making for
the short term as it affects long-range political issues.
My methodology will consist of an examination into the
nature of the American military decision-making process dur-
ing World War II, and an inquiry into the ways in which it
informed the political decisions emanating from the wartime
conferences. I have chosen the events surrounding summit
conferences as the vehicle of my discussion because the war-
time meetings between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin repre-
sented the apex of the Allied politico-military hierarchy
during World War II. Indeed, summit conferences in general
* Modelski, p. 173* This text is essentially a critique
of the nation-state dominant system of international relations
and the great power institution which maintains it.

3may be compared with the exposed tip of an iceberg; that is,
the events of summit conferences mirror in micro-cosm the
much broader, but less visible, causes and effects of inter-
state relations. In short, this paper asks why and how
American military decisions came to have such pre-eminent
political influence at Teheran and Yalta. Obvious corollaries
include inquiries into the nature and influence of military
decision-making on the part of the British and the Russians
at these conferences. An examination into these areas will
complement an understanding of the American foreign policy
position.
The basic issue, however, is rooted in the American
foreign policy tradition, and the main object of the discus-
sion will be to examine and understand the historiographic
detail in that context. The perspective of the paper most
closely equates with that of the liberal-realist critique,
which reinterprets the Gold War Warrior view of cooperation
turned hard-line containment, while at the same time ques-
tioning the moderate-to-radical revisionist claims of economic
determinacy. Thus, the perceptions of the participants at
the time, and the pervasive influence of America's foreign
policy tradition, are the final determinants of my thesis.

kGreat powers and Summitry
A state's national policy is the system of strategy
which it employs to ensure its security and to promote its
prosperity. Diplomacy is a political instrument of national
policy which has lost some of its importance due to the growth
of international conferences, particularly summit conferences.
The professional diplomat has not been replaced, but prime
ministers and other heads of state have usurped his function
more and more as modern means of transport and communication
have evolved. At Teheran and Yalta, more perhaps than at
any other meetings of heads of state during World War II,
competing national policies came face to face in the personages
of their chief articulators, and the implications of decisions
taken were great in the politico-military and diplomatic-
strategic realms. But basic to the theme of this discussion
must be recognition that all such forms of international
relations, including summit conferences, have conformed ul-
timately to the national interests of the proponent states.
Thus, it has been said that "Whenever peace (avoidance of
war) has been the primary objective of a power, the inter-
national system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless
member of the international community."^
^ Prank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in
World Politics (New York: American Book, 1937), pp. 21,29-30.
' Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1957), p. 1.

With these comments as an introduction, an examination of
summit conferences and summitry in general among the great
powers will be useful.
An idealized description of summit conferences portrays
the highest elected officials of the great powers, negotia-
ting from the seat of authority, with common sense and reason,
without the formality of diplomatic protocol, and arriving
at a quick, peaceful, and final agreement. However, exper-
ience has shown that entering the conference room and closing
the door cannot shut out the power struggle of competing
national policies in the real world. Similarly, the desire
to cooperate for peace has not yet achieved great success
in overcoming the balance of political power, or power poli-
tics. Dean Acheson's comments epitomize the good spirits
and air of optimism which attend the conduct of summitry,
but he warns of the potentially dangerous pitfalls. "So,
on to the summiti --hoping that those who go will be trans-
formed on the way into gods; and forgetting the Arab proverb
that the ass which went to Mecca remained an ass."
This warning should be well-taken, particularly for the
American foreign policy tradition, which has some unique and
complex considerations for the conduct of summitry. Among
them, the fact that the chief executive of the United States
Dean Acheson, Meetings at the Summit: A Study in Dip -
lomatic Method (An address at the University of New Hampshire,
May 6, 1950), p. 3.

6is at once its head of state and its military commander-in-
chief has practical disadvantages, such as the difficulties
and dangers of extensive foreign travel and absence from the
nation's oapitol. There are also political disadvantages
since the whole prestige of the state is wrapped up in his
policies and in personalized negotiations. These are valid
problems in a way and to an extent not usually arising in
the case of a removable British prime minister or an untouch-
7
able Soviet premier. ' President Roosevelt alluded to his
practical dilemma in a note to Premier Stalin on 9 November
191^-3 • "Personally my only hesitation is the place QFeheranJ
but only because it is a bit further away from Washington
than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at
that time and, under our Constitution, I must act on legis-
lation within ten days..." Though it was perhaps implicit,
Roosevelt made no direct mention of the inherent dangers
attendant to international travel by a head of state during
wartime.
7 Sir William Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers
(London: Hamish Hamilton, I960), p. 12,
Q
Foreign Relations of the United States-Diplomatic
Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 191+3 (Washing-




Foreign Relations- Cairo and Teheran
, pp. 273-285
describe the near-miss torpedoing of Roosevelt's ship by
its destroyer escort. Throughout the conference, security
precautions were elaborate, since Teheran was believed to
be filled with Axis sympathizers.

7A British perception of American political philosophy
is that "the American system of government is the most dan-
gerously personalized one among all the major democracies."
But this cannot be accepted as the dominant element, for Amer-
ican foreign policy has its roots deep in American attitudes
and opinions. America's simpler past gives it a supposed
tendency to overlook the really vital constituents of a sit-
uation and to impose upon it a pattern predicated upon the
assumption that the world is populated entirely by "would-
be Americans." Thus, the liberal, moralistic, and prag-
matic foreign policy of the United States perceives every
issue in black-and-white terms, and as a problem which can
be solved, no matter how difficult. When forced to inter-
vene by moral self-suasion, the United States would reluc-
tantly interpose its military might in a power vacuum to
fight power politics. In so doing, the U. S. believed fully
that the right of self-determination must be universal.
The result has been that European observers of American
foreign policy, such as Max Beloff,
...cannot but be struck by the great difficulty
which Americans seem to find in considering mili-
tary and political problems as part of a single
whole
.
Max Beloff, The Great Powers: Essay3 in Twentieth




8A corollary of this development was the growth of
a tradition among American military men that the
political consequences of their actions were no
part of their business. In the Second World War
they voiced consistent suspicion that their Brit-
ish allies took a different view and were too
prone to allow long-range political objectives,
other than total victory, to distort their stra-
tegic arguments.
Beloff's counter to such charges was simple:
Europeans know... that power politics and all that
this implies are the necessary consequence of liv-
ing in separate political societies and that war
does not enable one to contract out of this condi-
tion. 12
The harshness of this judgment against American foreign policy
makers may not be deserved. But one argument following from
such perceptions is that the American foreign policy tradi-
tion as described led to an unwillingness to attach territor-
ial and political aims to military objectives. Moreover,
this unwillingness can be characterized as firm anti-colonial-
ism which proved strong enough to "unite" Roosevelt in coopera-
tion with Stalin against Churchill and Great Britain, both in
Europe and in the Par East.
The issues of the imbalance of political ends and mili-
tary means appear time after time in virtually all wartime
accounts of American foreign policy. American diplomacy and
American military strategy are portrayed as divorced, as mu-
tually exclusive. Whether this is so, and if so, why, can
be examined in the context of decisions taken at the great
12 Ibid., p. 195.

9power summit conferences of World War II. In foreign policy,
the self-determination of the peoples of the world and the
security of the United States became coterminous concepts.
Only in these dual contexts of morality and security could
the United States bring itself to act in politico-military
affairs. Thus, world order in the American view evolved
as an undifferentiated whole, whose one part could not be
threatened without endangering the entirety. Corollaries
which follow are that peace must be indivisible and that an
13
enemy's surrender must be unconditional. -' In domestic policy,
the apparent successes and good feelings arising from the re-
cently concluded summits bred strong public support for
Roosevelt and his programs. The traditionally fearful
charges of "soft on communism" did not begin until after
19l|5, when the political results of the summits could be
discerned with the great benefit of hindsight. How justi-
fied was such 20-20 vision after the fact? The alleged
separation of political and military considerations looms
to the forefront again.
Charles Bohlen stressed the American foreign policy tra-
dition as it applied to V/orld War II. "We fought the war to
win the war. We paid less attention than we should have to
the possible consequences..., to what sort of political matters
13* Robert Osgood et al., America and the V/orld: Prom the





would require our attention." Between 191+2 and 19l|5, he
felt that "the United States military had a key voice, since
military policy was the primary matter before us... we would
not allow political considerations to deflect us very often
from this central aim...". ^ Dean Acheson observed that
the wartime conferences of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin
were "primarily military staff meetings at the highest levels." J
That is, whatever political deliberations were held at the
summits were ancillary to strategic military necessities.
One conclusion may be that unsatisfactory results were ob-
tained at these meetings since political concessions were
granted to effect military agreement within the Grand Alliance.
But this thesis must be tested against what considerations
were actually at the base of military planning prior to and
during the great power summits. For example, Acheson attaches
a moralist perception to his estimate of Soviet desires at
the summits. He perceived that they wished "to have their
conquests growing out of the last war, what they call the
territorial status quo, recognized, and to pursue the domina-
tion of the planet under cover of non-aggression pacts." He
also feels that "the conference at the summit is an instru-
mentality by which the Russians plainly believe they can speed
^ Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation of American
Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 21.
5 Acheson, p. 13.
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the disintegration of the Western position without in-
curring risk. It offers the unique opportunity to carry
on the cold war in the name of peace and by the processes
-l/i
usually associated with peace." This interpretation may
seem to be at odds with Acheson's known preference for real-
istic power strategies rather than the unrealistic pursuit
17
of Utopian principles in international affairs. Perhaps
there is a real attempt within the American foreign policy
tradition to meld the moral with the realist thesis. Such
a pattern would be observable in the roots of military stra-
tegy as it related to the wartime summits.
A common criticism of great power summitry is the pub-
licity, or sense of theatre, which overhangs the conference
proceedings and which interferes with the deadly serious
business of negotiating and deciding politico-military
matters of global importance. The physical presence of
heads of state at these meetings may not facilitate the
decision-making process at all, since the issues must be
ripe for solution anyway, or else nothing will be accom-
plished. Witness the summit decisions which were turned
over so often to the foreign ministers or military staffs
for further consideration. It has been suggested that more
16 Ibid., p. 21.
17 Glenn D. Paige, "The Korean Decision" in James N.
Rosenau, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy (New




might be gained if the chief executives remained insulated
from the great bulk of conference work, and then appeared
for the final sessions where only signatures and good words
were necessary. Acheson insists that the adjustment of
Soviet ambitions is, in the final analysis, the only route
to honest negotiations and peace. And while summit diplo-
macy is one methodology—a means for achieving these ob-
jectives—nevertheless the goal represents a most delicate
process, one which is unlikely to occur "in the glare and
blare of a conference at the summit." Still, Teheran
and Yalta represent productive conferences in terms of
political and military resolutions, quite apart from what
judgments one passes on the ultimate effects. Hindsight
and the overlay of the American tradition have heaped great
criticism on the advisability of many of those decisions.
This, of course, must be balanced xvith the perceptions of




Military Planning and National Policy
Behind the highly visible summitry, a vast opera-
tion of planning and coordination preceded every major
decision taken, both political and military. These not-
so-orderly processes were vital to the order and efficacy
of the international conferences, and the major rationale
of much that seems crucial to these meetings can be dis-
cerned from a study of lower-level methods and perceptions
in the context of larger issues. For the American part,
there seems to be a gradual shift from almost total absorp-
tion in strictly military, fight-to-win, unconditional sur-
render concepts to a greater appreciation for the complexi-
ties of the political realm, especially for the post-war
period. A look at these processes may be useful in setting
the scene for what followed at the summits.
President Roosevelt's personal methods in politics are
well-known. Perhaps less known is the opinion that his
"dominant role in politico-military matters was absolutely
19
clear." Seeking and receiving multiple and often redun-
dant side-inputs from personal emissaries, Roosevelt also
obtained advice from his State, War, and Navy secretaries
as individual advisers, not as a unified cabinet. In this
manner, he managed rather effectively, if not disconcertingly
19 Ray S. Gline, Washington Command Post: The Operations




to his official advisers, to keep the main strands of na-
tional policy almost totally in his own hands. The British
system of national policy direction at the same time was
much more orderly, and also formally constituted, by com-
parison. The highest executive authority in the United
Kingdom government was the War Cabinet, presided over by
the prime Minister in his capacity as Minister of Defence,
who in turn ruled over the Foreign Secretary and the mili-
tary chiefs. "Thus, the ultimate political responsibility
for the conduct of the war in all its aspects and the sen-
ior military advisers and agents of the government were
brought together in one organization under the Prime Minis-
ter, who gave unity and finality to War Cabinet Defence
20Committee decisions." The British military decision-
making process was itself unified and coordinated jointly
among land, sea, and air forces to complement this basic
policy organization. It is therefore small wonder that
British perceptions of American traditions and methods
should approach incredulity. But on the other hand, it
is not entirely correct or fair to imply that American
planners continued long in their haphazard and tunnel-
vision ways, especially in the face of a British 'united
front. 1 In short, the Americans learned through competitive
necessity from their British partners.
20 Cline, p. 99.
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The British-American combined military staff system
of World War II has been described as "a unique accomplish-
ment in co-operative effort by the military staffs of two
21great sovereign powers." Partly in self-defense against
the British system, but perhaps mostly due to the ever in-
creasing volume of coordinated policy requirements within
the American military itself, the United States military
chiefs' response to the well-established and efficiently-
operating British system of interservice collaboration was
the organization of a joint committee of army, navy, and
army air representatives to coordinate U. S. military posi-
tions. Presentation of proposals via a unified military
approach reaped dividends both internally and externally
for the U. S. military. The soundness of the method be-
came apparent as President Roosevelt came increasingly to
accept and respect the considered and combined opinions of
the three services. It also met the need to present a com-
mon front to their British counterparts. On both counts,
confidence in and respect for this new staff system grew
as the war progressed from midpoint in 19i|^-ij.3 toward the
ultimate events of 191+5. This operational planning insti-
tution was quasi-formalized with the first meeting of the
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 9 February 19i]-2. The
United States now had an established, though not yet statutory,
21 Ibid., pp. kl-k7.

16
counterpart to Great Britain's War Cabinet.
American and British participation at the Big Three
summit conferences, particularly at Teheran, marked what
was probably "the high point of general coordination of
22Allied military plans during World War II." The par-
ticipation of the Soviet Union cannot be minimized, but
it was always more complementary than cooperative. No
such formal staff organization or communications system
existed between the Russians and the We stern Allies as
existed between the United States and G^e at Britain in
the form of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). This
joint organization met first on 23 January 19l\.2, and
thereafter assumed the great bulk of strategic planning
for the western Allied war effort throughout the world.
Indeed, the formal conferences at which the heads of
their governments were usually present were designed
"to reach final agreements on issues which had been
thoroughly explored by the CCS. They were more near-
ly occasions for politico-military decisions than for
23the detailed work of military planning." As such,
the day to day CCS work supplied a basic pattern for
the strategic direction of American and British armed for-
ces. CCS responsibilities included explicitly the "formu-
lation of policies and plans" related to the "strategic con-
duct of the war." Thus, joint resolutions would be approved
22 Ibid., p. 98
23 Ibid., p. 100
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by the President and the Prime Minister "whenever broad
policy was involved," and therefrom "commands were estab-
lished, troops deployed, munitions distributed, and opera-
tions undertaken."
It is significant to note at this point that the co-
ordinating machinery of the United States military services
during World War II became much more highly developed than
any other part of the national policy decision-making appara-
tus. President Roosevelt came to rely heavily on the JCS/
CCS for advice on the conduct of the war, but he established
no comparable administrative organization for integrating
this highly coordinated military planning with basic Ameri-
can foreign policy objectives. He preferred to coordinate
this himself with the help of a personal staff of advisers,
such as Harry Hopkins. The State Department under Gordell
Hull was effectively shut out of the decision-making pro-
cess. Thus, in the early stages of the war, there was a
one-way flow of information from the military to the poli-
tical realm, but not vice versa. Admiral William D. Leahy,
in his unique position as Chief of Staff to the President,
was able to fill the gap partially by supplying information
to the JCS/CCS relevant to political decisions of military
interest. But this indirect and informal liaison could in
no way substitute for a formal staff network, which requires
effective and continuous two-way communications to implement
the strictly-defined doctrine of "completed staff work."

18
For Leahy was neither a member in full confidence of Roose-
velt's inner circle, nor a regular member in attendance at
meetings of the JCS. ^ In short, there was not yet an es-
tablished National Security Council which would provide
close, detailed, and frequent coordination in such matters.
Indeed, it was still twice removed from its future reality. ^
2
^ Ibid., pp. 98-101*.
^ Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics
of Leadership (New York: John Wiley, I960), p. 6.
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Teheran and the War in Europe
A. Teheran: Setting the Scene
One of the earliest examples of sustained politico-
military interaction is perhaps the long ocean transit of
the presidential party embarked in USS Iowa (BB-61) , enroute
to Teheran. The forced togetherness of so many high-level
planning and operational officials translated happily into
discussion periods where Roosevelt offered some of the best
and most frank guidance on politico-military affairs from
his perspective that the JCS could hope to get. As a corol-
lary, the U. S. military chiefs were able to collaborate
closely and deliver to the president considered opinions
on issues of deep, collective concern, issues which over-
rode the preferences of their individual services.
One such instance is a memorandum, which was signed
by Admiral Leahy, and authored jointly by General George
G. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Admiral Ernest J.
King, Chief of Naval Operations; and General H. H. Arnold,
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces. The memo ad-
dressed itself to the urgent military matter to be hammered
out at Teheran: the planned Allied invasion of northern
Prance (finally code -named Operation Overlord) to defeat
the German military forces and destroy Hitler's Nazi re-
gime. The focus of the Joint Chiefs was upon the urgency
of the need for unified command and single-mindedness of
purpose for Overlord. Roosevelt's top military men agreed

20
and stated that they would even accept a British officer
(Sir John Dill) as overall commander for European operations
if that would help solidify the plan. This dramatic con-
ciliation from military commanders who would send ultimately
the majority of soldiers, sailors, and airmen into the fu-
ture battle derived from a deep-rooted mistrust which the
JCS harbored concerning the British Prime Minister's dedi-
cation to the primacy of Overlord. This topic would
generate endless discussion at Teheran and can be consider-
ed a major thread of far more significant results than
initially conceived.
The major decisions taken at Teheran were ostensibly
military. They included, most importantly: (1) the estab-
lishment of a priority commitment to the cross- Channel in-
vasion of Nazi-held Europe in May 19ljij-» and (2) the first
overt Soviet promise of entry into the Pacific war against
Japan. But the mechanics of the meetings reflected con-
siderations of both strategic military planning and diplo-
macy. There is too frequently a tendency to minimize the
latter in the context of Teheran. This is most often seen
in observations which state that Teheran "was the last of
the great international military conferences of midiirar."
Such statements tend to draw a hard and fast line between
the military and political planning processes of the war-
Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York:
Harper, 19lj.8), p. 767.
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time Allies. Teheran becomes an all too convenient water-
shed for this division because it did in fact complete
military-strategic planning for Europe until the success
or failure of Operation Overlord could be known, sometime
in late 19i|I|-. Moreover, international summit conferences
between all three great powers did not resume until Febru-
ary 19^ (Yalta), and were held then under changed circum-
stances, "since the discussion of military matters on pure-
ly military grounds was rapidly becoming secondary in ur-
gency to reaching international understandings on the post-
27
war political world." But it is not accurate to ascribe
purely military motives to those decisions taken at Teheran
and earlier. Nor is it justifiable to claim that politico-
military considerations did not receive due recognition un-
til the full results of the Yalta conference became known.
In short, there is no clearly discernible line of division
between the two, and the only relevant criticism of early
and mid-war planning may be that it was too incremental on
the western side, and that it placed too much good faith
in the objectives of the Soviet Union, which were perceived
as parallel to our own. But even this judgment may seem
harsh in the light of internal American contingency plan-
ning, and of British fears of Soviet intent during this
same period.
27 Cline, pp. 231-232.
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Before Yalta, American military planners were well a-
ware of the political issues and their potential effects
upon future military operations. In one conference brief-
ing paper for American advisers, very simply titled "Po-
litical Questions Which May Be Involved In Military Dis-
cussions," a key query asked: "What is the Government's
view on Soviet participation in War against Japan if fur-
ther negotiations indicate that little contribution can
be expected from the Soviets and the result of their par-
ticipation would be to give them a greater voice in the
Pacific settlement and the possible absorption of North
China if the Kuomintang disintegrates?" This cautious
attitude on the part of the military reveals an unexpected
breadth of awareness of politico-military interaction in
terms of global interstate relations. Whether or not ef-
fective solutions to such questions were entertained or
offered is another question, but the main point is that the
American military did recognize and attempt to come to grips
with political questions on a broad policy front.
The British perspective is also enlightening on the
point of political and military awareness during the inter-
war years, for they were much closer to the real issues of
power politics in Europe than was the United States. In
October of 19l+lj-, the Normandy Invasion, supported on the
28 Ibid., pp. 330-331.
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eastern front by Red armies, was five months old. The
Russians had occupied both Finland and Bulgaria. They had
advanced over most of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and across
Poland as far as the Vistula River. They were in Hungary
and Yugoslavia, and had reached the frontiers of Greece
and Turkey. At this point, Churchill called for an im-
mediate meeting of the Big Three to delimit the advancing
Russian sphere of influence. But Roosevelt was in the
middle of a campaign for re-election, and would not con-
29
sent to travel until after 7 November. By Christmas
of 19kM-, the Battle of the Bulge was delaying the western
Allies' advance, while the Russians drove up the Danube
30
valley past Budapest and toward Vienna from the east.
By January of i9l4.fi>, Red armies had reached the Oder River,
only 100 miles from Berlin. The presence of Soviet troops
in all of these areas gave the British good cause to fear
the political consequences.
It may be that rather than a case of rigid separation
of political and military issues, the simple facts of pri-
orities and timing determined the combined western Allied
response to developing situations. This is another way of
describing the rationale for historical events in the con-
text of the perceptions of informed and active participants
29 Sherwood, pp. 832-83I4..
30 Ibid., p. 8I4.3.
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who lived through those events. A corollary of the prior-
ities theory is that military planning and foreign policy
came to affect each other more immediately and more direct-
ly as the war progressed.
In late 19l\l, prior to United States entry into World
War II and before the era of joint U. S. -British military
planning and cooperation, the British had conceived of and
developed plans for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe, code-
31
named at that time Operation Roundup. Great Britain stood
alone at this point and vr&s threatened direly. But before
the plan had progressed very far, Pearl Harbor was attacked
and United States entry occurred. No sooner had American
and British planning become unified, than planning took on
a decidedly political as well as military significance.
Invasion plans across the English Channel in 19^+1, '^2, and
>1{.3 were begun and then put aside due to lack of sufficient
resources. But even during these early stages, the western
Allies perceived the need to keep Russia in the war on the
eastern front. The obvious way of accomplishing this ob-
jective was to promise and then mount, as soon as success
was reasonably assured, a western offensive. Indeed, un-
til the western front could be opened, the eastern battle
lines would remain at an impasse deep within Russian ter-
31* Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack: The United
States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent
of Documents, 1951), pp. 6-12.
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ritory. The British wanted a western front, but knew that
they could not go it alone. The Americans wanted a x^est-
ern front to speed the victory in Europe, so that they
might then shift the combined force of the Grand Alliance
intact to the Pacific against Japan. The Russian objec-
tives are more speculative, but certainly included the
desire for an end to the bloody fighting in Eastern Eur-
ope, as well as whatever political gains could be maxi-
mized in the Pacific.
President Roosevelt had called for "action in 19l|-2--
not 1914-3* " General Marshall had demurred, explaining that
preparations were underlay but were not yet fully ready.
However, Roosevelt, true to his personalized methods, sent
Stalin a note which virtually promised a western front in
191+2 . This on-again, off-again style of dec is ion-making
characterized Allied planning to a great extent in 191+2,
and points up the roots of U.S. -British dissension over
European priorities. Moreover, U.S. naval victories in
the Coral Sea and at Midway had relieved the immediate
pressure for maximum speed of advance in European opera-
tions. Great Britain thus preferred to opt for extended
operations in the Mediterranean, while the United States
32
clung to the primacy of invading northern Prance. The
32 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins
of the Gold War, 19JJ.1-19JJ.7 (New York: Columbia, 1972), pp. 6£-




upshot of the disagreement became the combined U.S. -British
invasion of North Africa in November 191+2. This operation
represented a multi-faceted concession within the Grand
Alliance. First, it was still far too early to contem-
plate the Normandy Invasion. Large-scale logistics re-
quirements were proving a monumental problem, as attested
to by General Marshall's difficulties with procurement of
sufficient heavy landing craft from all over the world.
The United States therefore conceded to Britain in its
call for alternate, interim operations. Second, the North
African invasion would relieve the Nazi military pressure
on the Soviet Union. Such action would therefore appear
as at least partial satisfaction of Russian demands for
assistance, would likely keep them actively engaged in
the war, and would enhance the probability that they would
enter the Pacific war against Japan. Finally, a joint,
western Allied invasion of Vichy-controlled French North
Africa would be the first major step toward driving the
Axis powers from the Mediterranean, a step which would ob-
viously please Churchill and the British military.
Churchill saw a secondary goal of north African opera-
tions in the acquisition of bases from which to "strike at
the underbelly of the Axis in effective strength and in the
33




culty between the British and American war strategies. Brief-
ly, Churchill wanted to take advantage of situations of oppor-
tunity as they arose. Marshall, on the other hand, saw great
dangers in fighting a world war on "a day-to-day opportun-
istic basis." The issues became a question of priorities
between employment of incremental tactics or adherence to
an overall grand strategy, of seizing opportunities for
Mediterranean operations or of subverting the cross-Channel
attack. The American preferences were clearly with Opera-
tion Overlord, and they regarded anything else which might
compromise it with suspicion. The British, on the other
hand, viewed American pre-occupation with getting to the
Pacific war as soon as possible with equal ambivalence.
This running disagreement has been subjected to per-
haps too superficial explanation by many historians who
describe it as the archetype of American propensities to-
ward solely military solutions and of British appreciation
for political priorities. Prom the American point of view,
the British argument for Mediterranean operations was de-
fended in terms of a need to knock Italy out of the war.
After this first goal had been achieved, the British would
and did find new justifications for their "soft underbelly"
tactics by calling for Balkan thrusts. Here lay the rub
for U. S. planners; these plans were incremental, indefinite,
and indecisive compared to the cross-Channel invasion plans,
which even the British acknowledged were the only ultimate
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hope for victory. The United States did not wish to be di-
verted from its avowed purpose: total defeat of all Axis
powers and their unconditional surrender so that world
peace under a United Nations organization might be re-
stored permanently.
But the internal organization of U. S. planning was
not so unified as it might have appeared to outside ob-
servers. The Navy's Pacific emphasis competed with the
Army's European stress during planning operations and e-
roded the American policy position vis-a-vis the British.
Moreover, Roosevelt's secrecy with political policies fur-
ther eroded the American front. U. S. domestic politics
completed the triangle of opinion on the American side.
For Roosevelt felt that U. S. public opinion was a fragile
thing which must be handled sensitively where American
troops were involved. In an acknowledgement which ulti-
mately shored up the American commitment to Operation Over-
lord, he admitted, "I would never survive even a minor set-
back in Normandy if it were known that substantial troops
were diverted to the Balkans."-^ Later, at Yalta, Roose-
velt also admitted privately to Stalin and Churchill that
he did not feel that he could maintain support in Congress





years. •* Nevertheless, it seemed that, at least externally
and officially, the United States would present a solid
front of agreement, especially at the international con-
ferences. But two events occurred to shake this unity.
On 9 November 19lf.3» two days before the President and his
advisers departed Washington for Teheran, General John R.
Deane of the U. S. military mission at Moscow sent a cryp-
tic message. In it he warned that the Soviet Union might
suddenly reverse itself on its demands for a western front,
and instead call for intensified operations in Italy or in
the Balkans. He attributed this to recent striking successes
of Red armies, which might have convinced the Russians that
an immediate, if limited, assist from the West might prove
more fruitful than a full scale European invasion six months
later. This news must have dampened seriously the feeling
of unity and purpose which the U. S. intended to instill
in the Grand Alliance by trumpeting the primacy of Overlord.
It may have placed in great doubt also the probabilities
for Soviet entry into the Pacific war against Japan.
The results of the Teheran conference show that the
Russians lived up fully to the Americans' initial expecta-
tions, even to the point of verbally promising eventual
Pacific entry. The results of the Yalta conference for-
J> Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1963), p. i+5.
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malized this promise. It is not surprising, then, that a
strong wall of American faith in Russian wartime military,
and postwar political, intent should have been established.
The only chink, which proved quite temporary, was Roose-
velt's initiation of discussions on Balkan possibilities
during the first plenary meeting at Teheran. Churchill
was understandably delighted, while Roosevelt's military
chiefs were quite chagrined. The President's purpose has
never been satisfactorily explained, but may have been,
first, an effort to table the main issues at once, while,
second, maintaining the appearance of evenhandedness toward
the British position. In any case, it did not significant-
ly change the results.
B. The Gross-Channel Invasion and the Drive to Berlin
As the war in Europe came to a military conclusion and
operational emphasis shifted into high gear in the Pacific,
politico-military issues commanded center stage in the work
of the national policy decision makers. The need for an
effective methodology to deal with them became acute. Amer-
ican military staff officers learned from experience that
their President, as well as the British prime Minister,
could not make firm pronouncements on military strategy,
even in the midst of world war, solely on the basis of
considered advice from professional military men. They
came to realize that other sources of information had to
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be weighed, including the State Department and personal ad-
visers to the President. What worried them was the fact
that the planning and decision making processes of other
agencies were not as integrated as was the basic military
machinery. This created problems of perspective and com-
munications between military and political branches. Early
on, U. S. military planners proceeded on the premise that
Roosevelt wanted "to win the war in the way most efficient
from a strictly military point of view." This assumption
Of.
"underlay American strategic planning for World War II."
General Marshall felt that military strategy had to be de-
cisive in the conduct of a great war. It was therefore
concluded that, while the war was on and American troops
were in the line of fire, military considerations would
take precedence over all others. The British, by contrast,
were assumed to be planning in accordance with the require-
ments necessary to achieve postwar political advantage. It
was well known that they had fully integrated political
and military aspects of their x^ar plans through the Execu-
tive Secretariat of the War Cabinet. But this fact alone
may be too easily construed as indicative of short-term heed-
lessness for the lives of British soldiers, implying military
sacrifices for purely political gains. The question should
be: just how much at odds was the British position with that
3& Cline, p. 313.
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of the Americana, and why?
More than others, Churchill and the British remembered
all too well World War I losses, Dunkirk, and the slaughter
of great land battles in Prance. Of the Big Three, only
Churchill had fought that war, knew the great costs, and
personally dreaded reliving it. Therefore, he may have
wished to do anything which might make crucial decisions
like Operation Overlord easier, or perhaps unnecessary.
The tentative date set for Overlord's execution across the
English Channel was 1 May 19fyi|. By that time all logisti-
cal operations would have been completed and the milder
weather would permit relatively safe crossings. But there
were significantly different, if equally justifiable, rea-
sons on the part of American and British planners for not
rushing into the operation. As Army Chief, General Marshall
' had become absorbed totally in all facets of the problem,
not the least of which was gathering from all over the globe
as many landing craft as could be spared from lesser prior-
ity operations. He had also become acutely aware of the
substantially increased risks of ocean-going amphibious
maneuvers as opposed to the more conventional, protected-
water, or riverine type. Marshall noted that failure of
a river crossing meant a temporary reverse, while failure
in the English Channel would signal disaster. It is dif-
ficult to fault him in this respect for giving the military
aspects of strategic planning a clear priority.
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Churchill never questioned Marshall's military judgment
on such matters. But he did see disadvantages in not ex-
ploring other avenues, despite the fact that Overlord had
been in the planning stage for two years, and that the
Russians had been calling for a "second" front with in-
creasing pressure. Churchill perceived at least tactical,
and potentially strategic, drawbacks in the persistent
time lags which accrued while the right conditions for
Overlord i^ere sought. This argument he "pressed upon the
President and Stalin on every occasion, not hesitating to
37
repeat the argument remorselessly...". The Prime Minister
saw no real diseconomies in implementing secondary opera-
tions throughout the European theatre, particularly in the
Mediterranean. Such interim operations might prove enor-
mously fruitful, even if they caused a six-to-eight week
delay in Overlord. He stated as much, with some feeling:
"Simpletons will argue, 'Would it not have been much better
to centre all upon the decisive operation and dismiss all
other opportunities as wasteful diversions?' " j whereas,
"Alternatively I preferred a right-handed movement from
the north of Italy, ..., toward Vienna."-^ In recounting
these arguments Churchill sought to counter the "legend
3
' Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 3W
38 Churchill, p. 3l|5.
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in America that I strove to prevent the cross-Channel en-
terprise called 'Overlord,' and that I tried vainly to
39
lure the Allies into some mass invasion of the Balkans...".
In reflecting upon his eventual failure, he said, "I could
have gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the
prejudices of his military advisers...".^" The President's
Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, contended repeatedly that
Churchill's motives lay in a pet project of ill-defined
purpose to capture the island of Rhodes. As far as Leahy
was concerned, "the American argument was so logical that
I cannot but believe that as professional soldiers they
[the British staff] knew Overlord was the most sensible
move to bring to an end the war with Germany in the short-
est possible time."^" These comments reflect the diversity
of Western opinion surrounding the summit discussions held
at Teheran.
The Western Allies did not present a united front of
military judgment to Stalin, who did not hesitate to speak
his mind. He questioned the wisdom of dispersing Allied
forces from the Overlord commitment for any purpose, saying,
"among all the military questions for discussion, we, the
39 Ibid., p. 3kh*
^ Ibid., p. 3l|.6.
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There (New




USSR, consider Overlord the most important and decisive." h
Stalin looked circumspectly at all operations from Italy
across the Adriatic and into the Balkans toward the Danube.
He contended that such plans were mere diversions and passed
favorably upon only a supporting operation in southern
Prance (code-named Operation Anvil), which would ultimately
link up ifith the main, eastbound force of Overlord. The
Soviet Premier therefore continued to press for a definite
date for the Normandy Invasion and the nomination of a
supreme commander; with this information he could return
with reassuring news to his troops at the front and get on
with the task at hand. Thus, Stalin repeated his support
for Operation Anvil and chairman Roosevelt acquiesced, turn-
ing the matter over to the CCS for hammering out the mili-
tary details. Immediately prior to the adjournment of the
second plenary meeting at Teheran, Stalin taunted Churchill,
saying, "I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime
Minister about 'Overlord.' Do the Prime Minister and the
British staff really believe in 'Overlord?' " Churchill,
who Ttfas aware of Stalin's propensity to deride him and things
British in general, retorted, "Provided the conditions pre-
viously stated for 'Overlord' are established when the time
comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel
^ Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York:
Harper, 19ij.8), p. 787.
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against the Germans every sinew of our strength."^ Stalin
literally backed Churchill into a corner to elicit a firm
commitment to Overlord. The flavor and power of personal
diplomacy in summitry is unmistakable here.
What has this intimate description of summitry to do
with the military and political realities of the situation?
The perceptions of the participants, once examined, help
to illuminate the developing situation. With troops al-
ready battling up the Italian peninsula tox^ard Rome, Churchill
saw obvious advantages to thrusting northeastward toward the
Balkans. He had proposed the subject first in November 19^4-2,
when Red armies were still 600-700 miles east of Warsaw.^"
Now that Great Britain was relatively secure from Nazi in-
vasion, compared to a time before the United States had
entered the war, Churchill had occasion to consider post-
war matters. It is not strange, then, that he should fore-
see that the Balkans would be a good place for Anglo-American
armies to be found at war's end. For his part, Stalin
sought to emphasize the urgency of Overlord in a primary
and singular sense. He pressed home the fact that Russia
^3 CJhurchill, p. 373.
^ Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire (New
York: Praeger, 196i|), p. 103.
^ James B. Harrison, This Age of Global Strife
(Chicago: Lippincott, 1952), p. 160.
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could be defeated still on the eastern front, and implied
that the Red armies would need all the support they could
get from the West, both in the form of continued Lend-
Lease equipment as well as heavy troop assistance on the
western front. Stalin knew that the sooner the cross-
Channel invasion began, the sooner the Nazi pressure to
the east would slack off. The savagery of the German
attack on Russia was matched only by the vast size of the
area to be conquered and held through the terrible Russian
winter. For good reason had Russia never been attacked
successfully from the west. Nevertheless, Hitler's deter-
mination caused Stalin much concern, and he was eager to
acquire the upper hand firmly. Also, Stalin may have be-
lieved that the tide was turning on the eastern front,
even at the time of the Teheran conference. General
Deane's message from Moscow had raised this possibility
as a consideration for American planning. In any case,
however, Stalin continued to press the concept of an ad-
vancing eastern front in concert with the Normandy In-
vasion. At this point, he, like Churchill, may have had
time to consider the future. Thus he may have perceived
that once operation Overlord was firmed up as a singularly
important event, the possibility of Anglo-American troop
concentrations in ea3t-central Europe would be minimal.
^ Librach, pp. 10l|-107.
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Finally, as head of state of the Soviet Union, Stalin
would consider Churchill's Balkan proposals as a jockeying
for postwar imperialistic ambitions and advantages in what
Russia viewed as its natural sphere of influence.
The American position seemed to be one of expediency.
U. S. planners had a keen appreciation of the need to keep
Russian armies in the field against the Germans. This was
predicated upon their desire to defeat the Nazis as quick-
ly as possible, in order to get on with the desperate bat-
tle in the Pacific. Thu3 Roosevelt had even considered an
emergency invasion of western Europe in 191+2, so high was
his concern. The President had committed himself to a
speedy end to the war in Europe, so he entered into an
unspoken Soviet-American "community of interest," which
was implicitly against Great Britain and ultimately a-
gainst the future of an independent eastern Europe.
When Stalin immediately dedicated Russian troops to the
Pacific effort against Japan just as soon as Germany was
crushed, the Americans were understandably pleased. They
could have no idea at the time that an atomic bomb would
obviate the need for Russian support. Rather the U. S.
^ J. B. Harrison, p. 160.
^ Robert D. Warth, Soviet Russia in World Politics




military foresaw the valuable use of Russian bases and air-
strips as much better locations than Chinese bases for carry-
ing the war to Japan. The relatively short-range combat
gains could not be weighed then against the unknown, poli-
tical long term of the postwar period. The United States
therefore wanted Overlord to commence on time and with min-
50imal chance of failure. When Stalin promised a simultan-
eous eastern front and subsequently launched it on schedule,
the Americans developed great faith in Stalin's reliability,
and this wall of faith "stood much abrasion before it crum-
bled."^1
Shortly after the Teheran conference ended, Charles
Bohlen concluded in a memo that "The result (of Stalin's
Teheran statements) would be that the Soviet Union would
be the only important military and political force on the
continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced
Co
to military and political impotence.""^ Roosevelt either
did not share Bohlen' s gloominess of feeling, or perhaps
thought that the war progress resulting from the meetings
overshadowed such facts which might in any case be changed




^ Herbert Peis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War
They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Prince ton
University, 1957), p. 261+.
^2 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969
(New York: Norton, 1973), p. 153.

later. At the same time, the American Embassy in Moscow
reported a "revolutionary change" in the Soviet attitude
toward the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet
propaganda machine was obviously very enthused over the
"Historic Decisions" taken at Teheran. ^ But the euphoria
was short-lived. As early as January of ±9L\M-> Ambassador
Harriman lamented that official business had become once
again very difficult to complete with the Russians, He
informed Churchill by letter that "The Russian Bear is
demanding much and yet biting the hands (Lend-Lease)
that are feeding it." ^
Poland soon returned to the fore as the most difficult
political problem. According to Churchill, the Polish is-
sue clouded the success of Teheran more than any other.
The problem of moving the borders westward had not been
stated precisely enough to bind the Russians. When Roose-
velt reiterated the point that his opinion on the frontier
issue had left Teheran in a flexible state, both Stalin
and Molotov claimed that Roosevelt had agreed specifically
to the Gurzon Line. ^ This conflict has been attributed
" Sherwood, p. 801}..
5* Peis, p. 279.
Foreign Relations- Cairo and Teheran
, pp. 599-601,
describes the Curzon Line as a generally north-south line a-
long the Bug River, approximately 100 miles east of Warsaw.
Stalin asked that parts of eastern Prussia, including the
ports of Konigsberg and Tilsit be given to the Soviet Union.

in
to a possible error In translation. The Soviet govern-
ment, however, saw an overriding need for a strongly pro-
Russian Poland to prevent a future re-attack by Germany.
In the early months of 19i|lj. before D-day (6 June), Churchill
made his final pleas for the scrapping of Operation Anvil
in southern Prance and for the adoption of a plan to cross
the Adriatic from Italy into Yugoslavia in a northeast
thrust toward Vienna. But once again the Normandy Inva-
sion assumed singular importance, and his plans "were cast
aside unused."-^ Churchill regarded "the failure to dom-
inate the Aegean as an error in war direction which cannot
be excused by the fact that in spite of it victory [mili-
tary, if not political] was won."
What conclusions can be drawn about the cross-Channel
invasion? To what extent were its military operations means
toward political ends? What military and political consider-
ations were weighing upon the combat commanders' decisions?
On 25 March 19l4-5» Anglo-American armies were in possession
of the entire west bank of the Rhine River. Montgomery's
British-Canadian forces crossed the Lower Rhine and pushed
northeastward for Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, and the Baltic
Sea. After winning the industrial Ruhr area, Generals
Simpson's U. S. 1st and Hodge's U. S. 9th Armies spear-




headed across the Elbe River on 12 April, only 60 miles
from Berlin. Field-Marshal Montgomery had pressed re-
peatedly for "a single Allied thrust to Berlin," ever
since the western Allies had crossed the Rhine. Eisen-
hower at the same time made it clear that he was "more
interested in the Ruhr than Berlin." Thus, while Monty
and Great Britain wanted Germany's political heart, Ike
and the United States wanted its military-industrial
heart. There was evidence to back up the U. S. position.
On the military side and in support of Eisenhower's view,
General Omar Bradley advised that casualties would be very
high in any offensive against Berlin. In pragmatic terms,
Bradley perceived the estimated losses as "A pretty stiff
price to pay for a prestige objective, especially when
we've got to fall back and let the other fellow take over."
Both Forrest Pogue and William Shirer agree in essence on
Ike's militarily-oriented tactics at the Elbe River:
Eisenhower's purpose now was to split Germany in
two by joining up with the Russians on the Elbe
... . Though bitterly criticised by Churchill and
the British military chiefs for not beating the
Russians to Berlin, as he easily could have done,
Eisenhower. .. £ wasj ...obsessed at this moment
with the urgency to head southeast after the
junction with the Russians in order to capture
the so-called National Redoubt, where it was be-
lieved Hitler was gathering his remaining forces
£8
' William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third




to make a last stand... .
Ike was therefore unwilling to countenance the Nazi's final
end-run, nor to run the risks of unnecessary losses while
taking Berlin first. On 16 April 19^5, Eisenhox^er' s Ameri-
can and zhukov's Russian armies met at Torgau on the Elbe,
some 75 miles south of Berlin. At this point, the European
military operations planned at Teheran were completed.
Stalin had effectively carried out his military mani-
fest destiny by successfully completing in reverse that
which Churchill had so zealously advocated. Rome had been
liberated by Anglo-American troops on l\. June 19J^-, two days
prior to D-day. At that time, Red armies were advancing
into Romania from southern Poland. The Russians entered
Bulgaria and Hungary in September and established contact
with Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. Soon they were in
Bucharest, Sofia, and Belgrade. At Yalta and Potsdam,
the western pair of the Big Three attempted to modify and
reverse some of the extensive Russian gains in east-central
Europe. Although many mollifying words were put down on
paper, little of significance was actually changed in the
postwar territorial situation. Roosevelt went on to fight
the war in the Pacific; Stalin consolidated his gains in
Forrest Pogue, "Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at
the Elbe," World Politics IV, 3 (April 1952), pp. 356-368;




eastern Europe; Churchill, seeing himself closest to the
losing end, said:
...vast and disastrous changes have fallen upon
us in the realm of fact. The Polish frontiers
exist only in name, and Poland lies quivering
in the Russian-Communist grip. Germany has in-
deed been partitioned, but only by a hideous ,.,
division into zones of military occupation. .
.
It is interesting to note the comments of the arch-
enemy of the Grand Alliance. On 12 December 19i|i}-, in what
might have provided the impetus for the Nazi thrust which
generated the Battle of the Bulge, Adolph Hitler addressed
his generals:
Never in history was there a coalition like that
of our enemies, composed of such heterogeneous
elements with such divergent aims... Each of the
partners went into this coalition with the hope
of realizing his political ambitions... America
tries to become England's heir; Russia tries to
gain the Balkans... England tries to hold her
possessions... Even now £oneJ can watch how these
antagonisms grow stronger and stronger from hour
to hour.°2
It is difficult to associate such insights into one's oppon-
ents with the ravings of a lunatic.
The Soviet Union remained firm in placing the Polish
frontiers at the Curzon Line on the east and the Oder-Neisse




Rivers on the west. J Russia's interpretation of a govern-
ment "friendly" to the Soviet Union came to mean a Communist-
controlled government. Thus the polish government-in-exile
at London was excluded in favor of the Soviet-controlled
Lublin government, who would eventually represent Poland
at the 19lj.5> San Francisco United Nations Conference. Al-
though Churchill, Roosevelt, and later, Truman, urged con-
sideration for the London Poles and disputed the Oder-Neisse
border, which displaced six million Germans, there was no
real countervailing power to move the Russians. ^ Compro-
mises agreed to at Yalta and Potsdam were never adhered to,
and the West recognized finally, though reluctantly, the
reality of the split between themselves and the East.
Returning to the original issue, "Did Ike halt at the
Elbe for purely military reasons?", the answer must be a
qualified no. Both Marshall and Eisenhower, as the two
leading military strategists in the European theater, were
painfully aware of the political ramifications of their
decisions, though neither attempted to be seers. But they
^ James B. Harrison, p. 267. The Oder River flows in a
generally southward direction from Stettin on the Baltic to
Frankfurt, whereafter it zig-zags sharply to the east and then
southeast to Breslau. The western tributary of the Neisse
River continues directly south of the Oder from Frankfurt to
Liberec. There is a considerable wedge of territory between
these rivers in the area south of Frankfurt. The Russians





would not compromise their military professionalism or
their men's lives, and in this respect President Roose-
velt and American opinion supported them fully. The
American foreign policy tradition would not have allowed
an amoral, or essentially political, goal to tip the
scales. Thus the decision to stop at the Elbe must be
viewed as the best politico-military decision which
could be made under the circumstances, given the disposition
of forces, the avowed ends of American foreign policy, and
the climate of U. S. public opinion.
The events of the Normandy invasion and its results
should not be viewed as occurring in a military vacuum,
nor in a totally uncoordinated and incremental process.
It is true that the American planners lagged behind ini-
tially with respect to the integration of the British
system, but the gap was recognized and to a great extent
filled as the war progressed. In the early years, liaison
between the military staffs and the White House was carried
on almost entirely by a few high officials, who could not
begin to handle the ever-increasing volume of work requir-
ing political and military coordination. Moreover, Presi-
dent Roosevelt often "formed his impressions and made his
decisions on military matters, as on others, without the
65benefit of fully systematic interdepartmental staff work."
6
^ Gline, p. 315.
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Indeed, Roosevelt often used his personal staff to draft
messages on military operations to Stalin and to others
without first seeking the advice of the JCS. The Ameri-
can military chiefs frequently became aware of military-
related messages from Roosevelt to Churchill via feedback
from British members of the CCS. ° This was at best an
embarrassing and awkward method of coordinating United
States military and foreign policies. But the picture
was not entirely a negative one, and things did improve.
In 19i^3> War and State Department coordination was
continuous, if informal. The lack of systematic coopera-
tion, as well as the U. S. military's envy of the integra-
ted nature of comparable British planning operations has
been discussed. Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer had both
recognized this deficiency for some time, and finally had
begun to voice their complaints. Wedemeyer observed:
The JGS frequently require information and advice
as to how their military decisions will affect
our foreign and national policies, or as to whe-
ther the decisions are in conformity with inter-
national law, or as to what effect, if any, their
decisions will have on our national Interests.
Some solution will be necessary if we are to a-
chieve that unity of national effort which is, so
well exemplified in the British organization. '
66
Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnama?: The
War and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York:
Harper and Row, 196b), p. 62.
67 Cline, pp. 317-318.

By the end of 191+3, the State Department began to furnish
the JCS with formal guidance in foreign affairs, thereby
establishing what came to be known as the "politico-
military field of Washington staff ltfork." The compound
adjective "politico-military" came into official use "to
characterize problems, policies, and actions requiring
consultation and preferably agreement between the State
Department and the armed services." Such problems, poli-
cies, and actions became evident as early as the Moscow
Foreign Ministers' Conference of October 191+3, when Big
Three representatives discussed political issues, which,
although outside the competence of military plans alone,
had nevertheless been created by the military situation,
and thus could be settled only on a joint basis.
Late I9I4J4. found Washington's staff work in politico-
military relations still too informal, unsystematic, and
behind the issues to deal as effectively with the issues
as was required. Ultimately the United States was forced
to see a need for what has been described as "the major
development of World War II in administrative procedures
for handling politico-military affairs,... the State-War-
C-i 58SWNCCJ." This precursor
of the National Security Council was established in Decem-
ber I9I4.I4.. The organization's formation may be perceived
68 Ibid., p. 326.
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as a watershed in the increasingly complete transition from




Yalta and the Far East: Soviet Pacific Entry
19l).3 may be characterized as the year of military de-
cisions for Europe. In 19i|i|. and early 19i|-5> the complete
military defeat of Nazi Germany was the primary issue. To
the extent that operations in the pacific against Japan
were discussed, they took a poor second place in interna-
tional politico-military planning among the Big Three.
But this is not to say that the subject was ignored--far
from it. The point to remember is that Pacific operations
had developed early on as an American venture, almost ex-
clusively run by the JCS. By the time the joint Allied
decision making machinery began to crank up to address
the defeat of Japan in the same way it did the defeat of
Germany, Japan surrendered and politico-military issues
were thrust to the forefront without benefit of the ex-
tensive and careful, joint planning which had preceded
those in Europe. Thus the comparison is necessarily limited.
As early as the Casablanca Conference of January 19i|3»
the CCS had considered the future Pacific war in the same
light as the ongoing war in Europe. "Prom every point of
view, operations should be framed to force the defeat of
Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Plan-
ning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within
69twelve months of that event."
69 Ibid., p. 336.
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The timetable was soon extended to eighteen months, and
discussions among American military planners centered on
the alternatives of a naval blockade-aerial bombing attack
alone or in concert with a full scale land invasion similar
to that at Normandy. As the success of the island-hopping
campaign from the southern pacific became apparent, and as
the Japanese opposition continued to be fierce, the United
States firmed up its commitment to a massive land invasion
supported by air and sea power, to begin as soon as possible
after VE-day. A massive Japanese force was believed to be
defending the home islands, and a combat-experienced force
in Manchuria was thought to be committed to holding its
gains. Though Roosevelt and his military advisers had
relegated China's military role in the outcome to a second-
ary one, the President nevertheless clung to his deter-
mination to make China a great power in his global poli-
tical plans for the postx^ar period. The issue of atomic
weapons and their possible use had not yet arisen, and
would not until Potsdam. Therefore, long-range strategic
plans for the Pacific war developed in conventional terms,
drawing upon European experiences and remaining within the
context of the Grand Alliance. Soviet entry into the Pa-
cific war continued to hold U. S. support generally, if
not individually. U. S. military planners remained skep-
tical of any early surrender by Japan, but the possibility
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of a Japanese collapse was noted in some American circles,
and contingency planning for a military occupation was
started with a target date of on or about VE-day. This
is not meant to counter the overall "worst-case" planning
which guided American military decisions, but it does
point up their awareness, however, limited, of the poli-
tical possibilities. However, as late as If. June 19l|5>
the United States still believed that "Probably it will
take Russian entry into the x-jar, coupled with a landing,
70
or imminent threat of landing, on Japan proper...".
The conference at Yalta in February 191+5 reinforced
this general trend in Allied planning, although little is
discernible in the official protocol and communique of the
meetings. Publicly, Yalta restated the goals of Teheran,
with attempts to specify the political issues in Europe.
Secretly, Yalta firmed up the military course of the war
in the pacific, formalizing the eventual entry of the
Soviet Union and according to it in return very signifi-
cant political concessions. Moreover, the entire agree-
ment was concealed from the Chinese Nationalist government.
Thus, Chiang Kai-shek did not learn officially the details
of American and Soviet policies with respect to China from
February, when the Big Three signed the document, until
August 19l4.5> when the Chinese were apprised fully of, and
70 Ibid., pp. 312-31(4.
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hardly able to reject, its conditions. The rationale for
complete secrecy from all but the highest levels of the
Grand Alliance was ostensibly military; it was feared
that Japan, if it learned of Soviet intent to enter the
Pacific war, might mount a pre-emptive counter-attack,
which could disrupt Russian troop and supply mas sings.
In this regard, Chinese Nationalist security was known
to have significant leaks and therefore could not be
trusted with such sensitive information. Roosevelt's
appreciation of the need for military security appar-
ently overrode his desire to make China's great power
status a political reality. The domestic fears which
bothered the President concerning the risks of Balkan
operations and American opinion would return to haunt
his successor in the form of charges that U. S. foreign
policy had caused the so-called 'loss of China' in later
years. Out of such fears would come the later Marshall
Mission and the eventual U. S. withdrawal from China.
The major contribution of the Soviet Union in the
Par East, entry into the war against japan, has a history
which antecedes Yalta considerably. Implicit assurances
of entry were given at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Con-
71ference of October, 1914-3- Stalin himself had reaffirmed
71
' Herbert pels, The China Tangle: The American Effort
in China Prom Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Prince-
ton: Princeton University, 1953), pp. 100-101.

this intent personally at Teheran in November 191+3 , greatly
72impressing the U. S. military chiefs.' Thus, the proba-
bility of Soviet participation received frequent and in-
creasing reinforcement, which in turn prompted a continu-
ing perception among American planners of its military
validity. The JCS levelled no specific criticism at the
73Yalta Par East Accords, ^ although they may have focused
more upon the strategic military considerations rather
than the postwar political implications. It is unlikely
that they were unaware of the political issues, given the
fact of broadly stated political ramifications in their
pre-conference briefs. But their desires to influence
the political aspects were probably limited by their pre-
occupations with the immediate and strategic, military
necessities. For just as moving large concentrations of
troops and heavy equipment across the English channel
represented a far greater challenge than more convention-
al water-crossings, so also did the prospect of massive
amphibious operations against fortress Japan, across the
Pacific from Okinawa, represent another quantum jump.
The military rationale of Yalta must be studied in
' Foreign Relations- Cairo and Teheran
,
p. 500.
1 J The text of the Yalta Protocol and Communique does
not contain the Far East Accord, which was revealed only much
later. However, it is included in many works, such as Diane
S. Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University, 1970), App. A.

the context of a two -ocean war. Since the conference was
held only six weeks after the Battle of the Bulge, no one
would guess at how long the Nazis might hold out, or as a
corollary, how long the subsequent battle against Japan
might last. There is a variety of perception over these
points, but in general it can be said that the United
States wanted the Soviet Union 'in' the Pacific war. ^
A British perspective, however, may qualify the U. S.
rationale in terms of the American foreign policy tradi-
tion. It is well known that Churchill considered China
and the Par East a secondary issue, at least as long as
Chiang Kai-shek remained in power. Churchill had been
sorely frustrated by Roosevelt's emphasis on China, es-
pecially at Cairo and again at Yalta. Indeed, he con-
sidered the concept of great power status for China "an
absolute farce." Moreover, he disclaimed any part in
formulating the Par East Accords and signed them only to
preserve Big Three unanimity. But what was Great Britain's
foreign policy in Asia, and how did it stand vis-a-vis
American policy? It is possible to define British policy
in Asia as a desire to retain colonies and colonial rights
^ Almost all cold war literature takes up the ques-
tion of Soviet Pacific entry; see further discussion in
section titled "Key Military Issues Reviewed."
Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 701.
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such as extraterritoriality. In China's view, this was ad-
verse to Chinese tradition, pride, and unity; in American
eyes, this was in direct opposition to the principles of
the Atlantic Charter. Both could construe Great Britain
as an imperialist power, whereas Russia by comparison was
not. Thus, Roosevelt may have had in mind an ulterior
political motive for Russian entry into the Pacific war.
That is, he may have wanted to insure another 'united
front' against Great Britain, just as he did in Europe
76
with the Balkan question. There is much speculation in
such theory, particularly if one considers the Russian
motives with respect to the Chinese Communists. The ques-
tion arises as to why Stalin covertly supported the GCP,
while at the same time overtly signing a treaty of friend-
ship with the KMT. Did he mean to have his cake and eat
it too? Did the CCP's ultimate victory surprise him, when
in reality he might have preferred an at least temporarily
divided China, like Korea and Indo-china, with the CCP in
77
control of the north and the KMT in the south? How did
the Russian participation in China relate to the American
position in Japan? Did the Russian and American heads of
' Chester Wilmot, "Stalin's Greatest Victory," in
R. P. Penno, ed. , The Yalta Conference , 2nd ed. (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972), pp. 67-66.
77 Harold C. Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese Politics
(New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 25.
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state agree implicitly to monopoly control in independent
Asian spheres as a quid pro quo ? Truly, Herbert Pels' meta-
phore of The China Tangle is an apt one, for there are many
more questions than clear answers.
Perhaps there is a single thread which can be drawn
from the maze to join American military planning and sum-
mitry concerning Asia to the American foreign policy tra-
dition. First, American foreign policy for China was
colored by Roosevelt's perception of great power status
for China after the war, and this was implied in the Cairo
Declaration of October 19^3 • Second, the need for Soviet
entry into the Pacific war against Japan assumed that the
war had a long way to go, and that continued cooperation
with the Soviet Union in the postwar period would be the
case. Both parts of the American view proved to be un-
realistic. Most significantly, the United States misread
and misunderstood the role and intent of the Chinese Com-
munists. The signals which were received were misjudged
at the field level and distorted to dim reflections of
their original meaning by the time they reached Washington.
Chiang Kai-shek had clung to the promise of the Cairo
Declaration, which called for the return of Manchuria and
Taiwan after Japan's defeat. Roosevelt hoped that the im-
plications of Cairo for China in the postwar world would
78
spur Chiang on to greater military efforts. This was to





be a vain hope, marked by the personal and professional
clash between General Joseph W. Stilwell and Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. This seemingly local problem intensified
into a running feud which concealed the much larger and
deeper issues of Sino-American misunderstanding and dis-
agreement. A simple view of the problem focuses upon the
relative merits of Stilwell' 3 burning desire to re-enter
and re-conquer Burma compared to Chiang's insistence upon
protecting the status quo in China itself. But there is
much more to the basic issue. Stilwell had an uncommonly
strong regard for the abilities of the Chinese soldier,
given effective leadership, but Chiang's socio-political
problems outweighed and eventually undermined his ability
to meet the military problems. The Asian goals of the
Soviet Union at this time cannot be known with any certain-
ty, but it is unlikely that the proliferation of opinion
from personal meetings of American officials with Stalin
et al. added any real understanding. Moreover, the CCP
and Mao Tse-tung were at the time unknown quantities,
despite the establishment of an American observer's group
in their midst.
Chinese -American difficulties intensified to a point
where Roosevelt decided to send a personal emissary, Gen-
eral Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley, a midwe stern lawyer of
sorts, accepted a mission as fact-finder and mediator to
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improve the situation. He made a great attempt to practice
the same personal diplomacy of which Roosevelt himself was
so fond. Initially, he was successful in gaining the friend-
ship of both Stilwell and Chiang. He had held apparently
intimate discussions with Stalin and Molotov enroute to
China, gaining from them verbal assurances of good faith
and cooperation. He had succeeded even in persuading the
Chinese Communists to draw up a reasonable list of actions
which would permit a CCP-KMT coalition. Hurley's eventual
report to Roosevelt that "There is no issue between you and
79Chiang Kai-shek except Stilwell..." is representative of
his fundamentally moralist attitudes and personalized di-
plomacy, which combined to make him see all problems as
resolvable in traditionally American, moral-legal terms.
It also led to General Stilwell' s ultimate recall, an event
which could not be forestalled any longer by his staunch
Washington advocate, General Marshall.
Sino-American relations improved temporarily with the
new team of now-Ambassador Hurley and General Albert C.
Wedemeyer, but Chinese Nationalist military performance in
the field against both Japanese and Chinese Communist forces
remained extremely marginal. Chances of a CCP-KMT union
vacillated, without results, and any semblance of meaning-
ful social or political reform within the KMT never pro-
79 Ibid., p. 198.
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gressed beyond the planning stage. In November 19l;£, Chiang
was very anxious to have Nationalist troops re-enter the
northern territories to accept the Japanese surrender.
American advisers counselled vainly for consolidation of
KMT positions in the south as a precondition for northern
deployments. But Chiang's will carried the day, and the
U. S. acquiesced to transporting his units. Immediate and
considerable difficulty arose in the form of opposition
from Soviet and Chinese Communist troops, who first pro-
hibited and later delayed Nationalist troop debarkation
at several northern ports. Thus, American advisers be-
came increasingly hesitant to engage U. S. forces in what
seemed increasingly like imminent civil war. When the
situation was in extremis from Washington 1 s point of view,
Truman dispatched the recently retired Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, George C. Marshall, to set things
right. Marshall was to accomplish what Stilwell, Hurley,
and Wedemeyer could not. Roosevelt's great faith in the
personalized diplomatic method had been taken up by his
successor, Harry S. Truman.
The Marshall Mission may represent a key to the nature
of and the results issuing from the American style of for-
eign policy. Marshall's great influence on the Washington
80 Ibid., p. 381;.
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military scene had carried over into the Allied domain
through the CCS, and it ascended to an equal influence
over U. S. politico-military affairs due to Roosevelt's
and later Truman's dependence upon the JCS in such mat-
ters. Indeed, Roosevelt had decided to retain Marshall
in Washington as CJCS while naming Eisenhower as supreme
commander of Operation Overlord. It was well known in
19^4-3-^-1- that Marshall yearned for combat command to add
the final touches to a brilliant career. But Roosevelt
had told him, "I feel I could not sleep at night with you
out of the country." Truman's respect for this man was
no less, for he characterized him as "the greatest living
American." Among his peers, Marshall was accepted as pri-
mus inter pares on both sides of the CCS.
Marshall indeed towered over the military scene in
Washington, due to his ability "to weigh calmly the con-
flicting factors in a problem and so reach a rock-like
decision... ." He epitomized the center of American po-
litico-military consensus on World War II decisions. He
possessed the entire confidence of the army, of Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman, and of the Congress. Therefore it
could be 3aid that "in general American strategy. . .emerged
from the White House much as it had emerged from the Pentagon."
81 Pfoffer, p. 63.
Op
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Prom the American perspective, then, xtfho could tackle the
impossible issues of Asia better than Marshall? Yet it is
noteworthy that the failures of so many otherwise qualified
leaders did not deter the basic American belief in a genu-
ine solution.
Marshall's instructions created within the American
policy position a dangerous paradox. To begin with, all
efforts were to be made toward achieving genuine unifica-
tion of the KMT and the CCP. Then, on the one hand, if
the CCP refused to cooperate, Marshall was authorized to
provide transportation to Nationalist troops as necessary
to reclaim Chinese territory. But on the other hand, if
Chiang refused to cooperate, he was nevertheless to be as-
Q o
sured of continued American support. Thus, no matter
what mitigating factors may have attended CCP non-coopera-
tion, and conversely, no matter how ineffective the KMT
may have become as a political and military force, the
American policy position hamstrung itself from the begin-
ning with upholding the implicit and explicit provisions
made two years earlier at Cairo.
Prom the earliest days of Stilwell's C-B-I assign-
ment until the last days of the Marshall mission, the Ameri-
can perspective of what was really happening in the Par East
and what American foreign policy toward it should be re-
J Peis, The China Tangle, pp. lp.8-lj.19.
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ceived only dim glimmers of understanding from a variety
of qualified, but disjointed, sources. One of the more
controversial sides of the issue was the opinion and in-
fluence of those Americans who formed the Observers' Mis-
sion to the CCP base at Yenan. These men included State
Department officials assigned to the American military
staff for liaison. The informal politico-military liaison
which this group provided planted the seeds of acrimonious
competition between themselves and the more conservative
KMT-advocates for Washington' s decision-making ear.
Prominent State Department specialists, among them
John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, and George Atcheson,
were labeled pejoratively as the "Davies-Service clique" ^
for their authorship of numerous reports critical of the
Nationalist regime and favorable toward the Chinese Com-
munists. John Service perceived the then-current (19i]l(.-
1|5) and official line on China from Washington as deficient
in three aspects: (1) The united States saw the primary im-
portance of China as an increased effort against Japan,
favoring short-term military decisions at the expense of
the political long run; (2) The U. S. desire for a political
settlement between the KMT and CCP was defined in terms of
American democratic-legal principles of the same order as




those which permitted a bipartisan foreign policy to exist
in the American system; and (3) U. S. decision makers formed
a consensus which stated that the Soviet Union basically
supported American foreign policy in China, and that an
eventual Sino-Soviet pact would confirm and sustain that
8^belief. ' Debate over these points formed the main thread
of the Hurley-Service debate and also of the vacillating
American policy toward China. The result was that Wash-
ington sustained Hurley and discredited the State Depart-
ment specialists. President Roosevelt died soon there-
after on 12 April 19i[.5>> and Truman sent Marshall to con-
tinue the vain American attempt at coalition.
The American plans crumbled when none of the actors
performed as expected. But the United States erred also
by not changing its policy in the light of altered cir-
cumstances. Perhaps the desire of the U. S. military to
have the combined strength available in a KMT-CCP coali-
tion against the Japanese caused them to overlook or to
misjudge the true nature and intent of the Chinese Com-
munists. Thi3 would have been reinforced by the tradi-
tional American doctrine of unconditional surrender, whose
often-repeated corollary called for ending the fighting as
soon as possible. Finally, the fear of a separate peace
8
'^ John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems
in the History of U.S. -China Relations ( B e rkeley: University
of California, 1971), pp. 83-86.
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between China and Japan may have compounded the issues fur-
ther, just as it did in Europe concerning the Soviet Union
and Germany. Recognizing these fears, as well as the Amer-
ican commitment to achieving a coalition of Ghinese forces,
why could not both the CGP and KMT have exploited this fear
and hope by converting them into levers to gain concessions
from the U. S. in the way of time, military aid, and poli-
tical advantage? Even the perceptiveness of a Stilwell or
a Marshall would have fathomed this situation only in terms
of their sense of duty toward China as a needed military
asset. In a negative sense, whatever the merits of China
as a military pox^er, the gross size of Chinese men under
arms would tie up a large number of Japanese troops who
would otherwise be used elsewhere against the Allies.
The charge of separation of military and political factors
must be qualified again, for the United States did become
progressively more aware of the politico-military ramifi-
cations of its China policy. However, the metamorphosis
came much too slowly to have any effect, and the American
foreign policy tradition prevailed.
The Marshall mission should have driven home to U. S.
policy makers at last the intractability of the American
position in the Par East, but it did not. It did not even





issues between the CCP and KMT. Thus, in part, the Ameri-
can foreign policy position was just as rigid as the Asiam
problems which it failed to solve. Just as if Marshall
had never gone to China, the Chinese pursued their destin-
ies and American policies tried vainly to alter them,
while at the same time supporting them.
Patrick J. Hurley's efforts to make sense out of China's
situation typify the American image of Asia, Communism, and
the American foreign policy tradition. Hurley was a mid-
westerner, a lawyer, a sometime army general, an ambassa-
dor, and a personal friend of Franklin Roosevelt. He held
more than enough qualifications to be a member of Washing-
ton' s decision making elites. But like many of them, he
was totally ignorant of Communist theory and practice.
Thus, he saw the first permissive stages of Chinese Com-
munism at Yenan as evidence of agrarian reform, not of
dedication to a radical nationalism imbued with the com-
munist principles of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, Hurley
had never studied the historical development of CCP-KMT
relations and the resulting deep ideological controversy.
He believed that the CCP could not compete with. the KMT
without massive aid from the Soviet Union. Therefore he
R7
misjudged badly their grass-roots capabilities. Stalin
87 Ibid., pp. 185-192.
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had personally assured Hurley of his country's good faith
with respect to U. S. goals in Asia. Said Hurley, "Stalin
no
keeps his word." If such beliefs formed the thread of
•informed' American opinion on China, then how could Chiang
Kai-shek, as silent and involuntary partner to the great
power decisions taken at Yalta, avoid signing a pact of
friendship with Stalin, a pact precipitated by the Yalta
Par East Accords? In short, it seems that the United States
never understood China well enough to "lose" it, but its
Par East policies certainly contributed to the inevita-
bility of events there.
Dissenting American opinion was in some respects no
less free of the traditional American foreign policy con-
straints. John Service failed to see the fundamentally
totalitarian nature of the CCP, despite its "democratic"
appearance which was displayed to best advantage at Yenan.
Thus, his favorable recommendations for the Chinese Com-
munists concerning coalition and even direct U. S. military
aid and assistance did not take into consideration the
fundamental role of ideology in the CCP, as in other com-
munist parties. The shortsightedness of these views,
though directly opposed to Hurley's, is also rooted pri-
marily in the morality and unity of the American tradition,
on
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1956) , p~! 6~6~T
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wherein "The ability of a tightly organized and rigorously
disciplined elite under able leadership to make a flexible
choice of slogans and means in its endeavors to capture
power was a political fact which American specialists,
trained and immersed in the liberal, democratic environ-
ment of a free society, failed to take adequately into
89
account." If American military and diplomatic pro-
fessionals on both sides of the political spectrum of
informed opinion could not sufficiently grasp this con-
cept, it is certainly no wonder, then, that the ultimate
decision makers could not do better for Asia and th6
world at the summits.
897 Tsou, p. 230.
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The Key Military Issues Reviewed
In an effort to examine the great power politico-mili-
tary relationships of World War II, this paper has studied
three issues of Allied war strategy which had far-reaching
significance: the decision for the cross-Channel invasion
of Normandy; the decision against an Anglo-American drive
to Berlin; and the perceived need for Soviet entry into
the Pacific war against Japan, These issues included
critical questions of military judgment which became in-
volved ultimately in political decisions. It is to an
examination of the perceptions of both civilian and mili-
tary participants who were very close to these issues
that this section turns.
A. The Cross-Channel Invasion
Among the panoply of American rationales for the cross-
Channel invasion, none stands out as well or recurs more
frequently than the perceived need for a single, decisive
operation which would simultaneously bolster sagging Allied,
and especially Russian, morale, and strike at the heart of
Nazi Germany. On 16 June 19i|-2, President Roosevelt advo-
cated increased lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union,
saying to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, "The whole
question of whether we win or lose the war depends upon
the Russians. If the Russians can hold out this summer...
we can definitely win." On II4. February 19i|l|-, Roosevelt
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wrote to Morgenthau: "Russia continues to be a major factor
90in achieving the defeat of Germany." Thus, Allied suc-
cess against the Axis in Europe became defined continuously
in terms of the need for a simultaneous and massive, east-
ern and western front against Germany. Complementary and
decisive action were the cornerstones of Allied strategy.
The memoirs of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson reinforce
this basic perception by citing United States entry into
the Atlantic war via Great Britain as the natural and best
route, while deprecating the inherently greater risks of
Mediterranean operations as proposed by Churchill. Stimson
advocated ceaselessly for General Marshall's cross-Channel
plan. "If Stimson or Marshall had been Commander-in-Chief,
the invasion of Prance would in all probability have been
launched in 19i|3» one year earlier than it actually occur-
91
red." Indeed, Stimson seemed even to begrudge Eisenhower
et al. ' s qualified agreement with the need for some Medi-
terranean operations to assuage Russian demands, to util-
ize available resources most efficiently, and to acquire
needed air bases in southeast Italy. However, he did ad-
mit to a difference in kind between these latter reasons,
which ultimately complemented the plan3 for a cross-Channel
90 John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of
War 19lq-19l]5 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 196?), pp. blj.-87.
91 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Ser -
vice in peace and War (New York: Harper, 19J+8T1 p^ lj.25.
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invasion, and the rationale put forth by Churchill, x^hich
Stimson suspected as an attempt to supplant North Atlantic
92
operations.
Forrest Pogue's biography of George Marshall rein-
forces the concept of an American commitment to Operation
Overlord as the primary military issue:
In short the most clearly defined, least com-
plicated, most decisive effort for the United
States in Europe was a thrust from the south
and west of England across the English Chan-
nel. . . .
The Americans saw clearly enough the political
advantages Churchill might gain for Britain by
his ^Mediterranean] policies. But if these did
not serve American interests, the U. S. Chiefs
of Staff preferred to deal in terms of military
advantages. °3
But this should not be interpreted strictly as irrefutable
proof of the United States' overstress on military issues
and its attendant lack of political realism. Nor should
it be cited as an example of American unanimity on war-
time priorities. For there were lower level military
planners who became disaffected gradually with the need
for Overlord as the primary operation. Among them, Brig-
adier General John E. Hull of the Operations Division grew
frustrated over the repeated delays and problems associated
with preparations for a joint cross-Channel invasion. Vice
92 Stimson, pp. q.33-4-34.*
93 Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of
Victory 19^3-19l|5 (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 10-11.
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Admiral Charles M. Cooke foresaw a chance to advance naval
goals in the Pacific at the expense of Operation Overlord.
Nevertheless, by the summer of 19l|-3> it became safe to say
that movements to downgrade Overlord were gaining little
9kheadway in Washington. ^
General Marshall's concern over logistics for the Nor-
mandy invasion preoccupied him much of the time, but he
maintained the broad picture of European theater require-
ments as well as any American leader. Emphasizing the
political issues, he repeated, "I doubt if there was any
one thing except the shortage of LSTs that came to our
minds more frequently than the political factors. [J3utj...
political factors were the business. .. of the President." ^
Thus, though political issues were admittedly paramount in
the long term, Marshall justified his rationale because
military casualties were very heavy costs to him, and he
could not permit himself or others, including President
Roosevelt, to become hardened to them. It was this over-
riding concern of America's top military commander which
made him stand firm against Churchill's final attempts to
siphon off Overlord's resources for continued Mediterranean
operations. Marshall was adamantly opposed to any diver-
sions toward Balkan operations, and said:
9i| Ibid., pp. 2lp.-2li.2.
9
^ Ibid., pp. 315-316.
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The "soft underbelly" had chrome-steel sideboards.
That was mountainous country. There was no ques-
tion in my mind that the West was the place to hit.
If we had accepted the Balkan thing, it x^ould have
scattered our shots. They are letting political
considerations after the fact dominate the whole
concept. 9b
Moreover, Marshall had only reluctantly agreed to the Italian
landings at Anzio, and the grievous setbacks experienced there
hardened his views considerably against further diversions
from what he considered to be the primary operation.
Even Churchill's own military chiefs, Field Marshals
P. M. Brooke and Wilson, had their doubts about Churchill's
"Balkan liking." They had to admit that, if all went well,
no one would criticize their success, but that if operations
T^ere to become bogged down for a time, then monumental lo-
gistics problems might develop and prove to be their down-
fall.
General Eisenhower harbored two suspicions about Church-
ill's call for an "underbelly" campaign: first, that Church-
ill's concern was too great as a political leader for the
future of the Balkans, and too little for its purely mili-
tary problems; and second, that he was indulging a personal
desire to vindicate his World War I support of the G-ailipoli
campaign, a disastrous affair which had occurred on the pen-
insula between the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea in Euro-
96 Ibid., pp. i|.l5-i4.19.
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97pean Turkey. ' But Eisenhower tempered these reflections
with the observation that Overlord's detractors have suf-
fered only because the invasion of Normandy was a great
success, and that a great reverse on D-day would have had
profound effects. He also recalled the earlier Allied
(Canadian) raid on Dieppe, a seaport in northern France
on the English Channel in August 191+2. This surprise
operation had suffered high casualties and had raised
98
ominous fears for Overlord's less zealous advocates.
Finally, Eisenhower's military experience dictated that
"In all the campaigns, and particularly in western Europe,
our guiding principle was to avoid at any cost the freez-
ing of battle lines that might bog down our troops in a
99pattern similar to the trench warfare of World War I."
Therefore, to the question, "Could a cross-Channel invasion
have been mounted in 19^3?" , the answer must be no. Gen-
eral Omar Bradley listed three reasons militating against
it. First, the U. S. Navy was engrossed in its buildup
for the Pacific war, one factor among many competing mili-
tary considerations which had divided the U. S. perspective.
Second, the British defeat at Tobruk, Libya increased the
97 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden
City: Doubleday, 19^8), pp. 191+-195.
98 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
99 Ibid., p. i|ij.9.
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perceived need for action in the Mediterranean, action which
would solve pressing issues such as Churchill's call for in-
terim Mediterranean operations and Stalin's call for imme-
diate assistance. Third, the unforeseen Soviet successes
at Stalingrad, together with American naval victories in
the Pacific, eased the urgency for an immediate western
front from both the Soviet and American perspectives. The
combination of these war-related events created, in Brad-
ley's view, a climate which "had wrecked Allied plans for
a 1943 Channel crossing." 100
B. The Drive to Berlin
The American perspective which caused the western Al-
lies ultimately not to complete the eastward drive to Ber-
lin must be understood in the context of the British argu-
ment for just such a thrust. Prime Minister Churchill and
Field Marshal Montgomery were the primary exponents of the
British view. On I4. September 191)4, Montgomery sent to Ei-
senhower a European situation report with his considered
observations and recommendations. One read, "I consider
we have now reached a stage xvhere one really powerful and
full-blooded thrust toward Berlin is likely to get there
and thus end the German war." According to Montgomery's
version, Ike replied on V~> September 19l|ij.» "Clearly, Ber-
Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York:
Henry Holt, 195U, pp. 188-191.

76
lin is the main prize... . There is no doubt whatsoever,
in my mind, that we should concentrate all our energies
and resources on a rapid thrust to Berlin." On 31 March
19l4.5> a chagrined Montgomery complained about what he per-
ceived as Eisenhower's renege on the primacy of Berlin.
Requoting Ike's "no doubt" statement, Montgomery Tailed
to complete the American's reply which had concluded, "Our
strategy, however, will have to be coordinated with that
of the Russians; so we must also consider alternative ob-
jectives." Thus, there seems to be a dichotomy of views,
wherein Montgomery attempts to demonstrate that Eisenhower
was not the skilled mediator, but a somewhat vacillating
de c i s ion-make r
.
For Montgomery's part, any armed force which had vic-
tory in sight had also to favor political over military
considerations
:
The important point was therefore to ensure that
when that day £VEj arrived we would have a poli-
tical balance in Europe which would help us, the
V/e stern nations, to win the peace. That meant
getting possession of certain political centres
in Europe before the Russians—notably Vienna,
Prague and Berlin.
Like Churchill, Montgomery lamented the fact that his recom-
mendations were not accepted, and he cited the results:
Berlin was lost to us when we failed to make a
Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
K.G., Memoirs (New York: World publishing, 1958), pp. 2l\l\.-Zl\S>,
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sound operational plan in August 19i|Ij-j after the
victory in Normandy.
The Americans could not understand that it was
of little avail to win the war strategically if
we lost it politically; because of this curious
viewpoint we suffered accordingly from VE-Day
onwards, and are still so suffering. V7ar is a
political instrument; once it is clear that you
are going to win, political considerations must
influence its further course. It became obvious
to me in the autumn of 19lf4 that the way things
were being handled was going to have repercus-
sions far beyond the end of the war; it looked
to me as if we were going to "muck it up." I
reckon we did. 2
Eisenhox7er» s version of these events is somewhat dif-
ferent. Concerning the September 19i|i|. exchanges, Ike re-
ported that Montgomery claimed only a need for adequate
supplies to take Berlin. Eisenhower disagreed, however,
since there were neither adequate stocks on hand in Ger-
many, nor railway bridges over the Rhine by which to trans-
port them. Moreover, he listed three reasons for not going
to Berlin: first, the Soviet Union would probably be there
ahead of the western Allies, given the disposition of for-
ces; second, a Berlin spearhead would immobilize the rest
of the western front; and third, German units i^est of the
Elbe would have to be kept divided and away from any last
stands at the so-called National Redoubt. Eisenhower was
aware of the Nazi hope that inter-Allied disagreements over
war strategy might result in time gained for German con-
±U£l Ibid., pp. 296-297.

78
solidation and for more favorable terras than unconditional
surrender. He was also unwilling to permit the realization
of any of these hopes. Thus, when, on 28 March 19l\S > as
Supreme Commander of European forces, Eisenhower informed
Stalin of his intent to move out on the Anglo-American
flanks after the Elbe- juncture with Russian troops, Church-
ill objected strenuously to Roosevelt. He claimed that
military aspects were being overtaken rapidly by politi-
cal issues and therefore called for an immediate thrust
to Berlin. Roosevelt and Marshall upheld Eisenhower's
judgment. Ike defended his actions as "a purely military
move." Marshall seconded this: "The single objective
103
should be quick and complete victory." •*
General Walter Bedell Smith's report of his staff ser-
vice with Eisenhower supports the Supreme Commander fully
with respect to Berlin. Though once an important goal,
Berlin "was losing all meaning as a military objective"
by the end of January 191+5 • Smith also stresses the
fact that the Elbe represented a natural line at which
Anglo-American troop3 could meet Russian troops with the
least chance of unfortunate incidents. This meeting was
the subject of detailed planning and coordination for sig-
103 Eisenhower, pp. 39o-q.02.
^ General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower' 3 Six Gre at




nals and recognition aids. Moreover, Smith observes that,
had the western Allies gone to Berlin, they would have had
to abandon it eventually, except for their assigned occupa-
tion sectors. Indeed, U. S. public opinion would not have
permitted American forces to keep Berlin long, because the
American people were still counting on the good faith and
postwar cooperation of the Soviet Union.
General Bradley revealed the extent of concern which
was generated by the news of a so-called National Redoubt.
Intelligence indications of this last-ditch Nazi plan were
exploded finally as a myth of fantastic proportions in the
minds of a few fanatics. But the threat at the time was
too ominous to be ignored, and "in conseauence it shaped
our [JJ . SjJ tactical thinking during the closing weeks of
the war." But it seems that the Redoubt issue was real-
ly always secondary. The political value of going to Ber-
lin would have been watered down by the pre-set zones of
occupation, which had been hammered out by the Grand Al-
liance. The prestige value of such a drive, especially
from the American perspective, could in no way compensate
for expected losses in men, losses which American military
planners were loath to suffer.
10
^ Ibid., pp. 221-223.
106 Bradley, pp. 536-537.
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C. Soviet Pacific Entry
The early entries of James Forrestal's diary contain
many references to the possible entry of the Soviet Union
into the Pacific war against Japan. The Secretary of the
Navy recorded his perceptions of how other officials in-
terpreted the military need. A comparison of Porrestal's
observations and other reports by military commanders seems
to indicate an American ambivalence about Soviet entry, or
at least a definite swing in opinion from "for" to "against"
as the war progressed. In February 1914-5* Porrestal's ver-
sion of General MacArthur's view is that the United States
could not concentrate needed strength to its best advan-
tage against the Japanese home islands unless the Japanese
Army in Manchuria was already heavily engaged. It would
take Russian entry, estimated at about sixty divisions.
Clearly, then, MacArthur envisioned a struggle of heroic
proportions, nothing less than a Far Eastern, two-front
107
war against Japanese forces in the pacific.
By April 1914-5* General Marshall was hoping for Soviet
entry "at a time when it would be useful to us," not after
the United States had "done all the dirty work." This con-
cerned attitude reflects the feeling that the Russians were
breaking the promises which they had made at Yalta. Yet
107 Walter Millis, ed. , and E. S. Duffield, The Forrestal
Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951) > P« 31.
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it can still be seen that "in the spring of 191+5 the im-
portance of bringing Russia into Manchuria in massive
force loomed far larger than it was to do in much later
retrospect." Also, the United States was committed im-
plicitly not to send troops into mainland China. By
July 19i+5» the prospect of an imminent Japanese collapse
became visible for the first time. A perhaps unforeseen
corollary of this was the attendant inevitability of
109Soviet Pacific entry.
The Japanese Kwantung Army, with close to a million
men under arms, had been in Manchuria since 1932, supposed-
ly awaiting the day of attack upon Russia. It was con-
sidered by some military observers to be a potentially
autonomous force which would fight on, even after Tokyo
surrendered. Moreover, the successful U. S. effort to
develop and ultimately use atomic weapons was at this
110time a wholly unknown quantity. Thus, despite contin-
uous and increasing lack of cooperation on the part of the
Soviet union, even close observers such as General Deane




John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of
Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with riussia (New York:
Viking, TWTT, PP. 223-225*.
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event which "would hasten the end of the war."
In early July 1914-5* while President Truman was en-
route to Potsdam for the final meeting of the Grand Al-
liance, General Eisenhower made it a point to caution him
about Soviet Pacific entry. At that stage of the war, Ike
had come to disapprove of Soviet entry, though he is quick
to point out that he did not foresee the East-West split
or the outbreak of the cold war. He "merely feared ser-
ious administrative complications and possible revival of
112
old Russian claims and purposes in the par East... ."
General MacArthur echoed these misgivings in his memoirs:
Prom my viewpoint, any intervention by Russia
during 191+5 was not required. The substance of
Japan had already been gutted, the best of its
army and navy had been defeated, and the Japan-
ese homeland was now at the mercy of air raids
and invasion. Although in 191+1 EsicJ I had
urged Russian participation..., by 191+5 such
intervention had become superfluous. 113
The seeming contradictions of opinion and the apparent
helplessness of these observers to change the course of e-
vents in the Pacific as World War II ended suggest that
such events may acquire an energy of their own, quite a-
part from the initial intentions of their framers. Never-
theless, the overriding concern of American planners through-
Ibid.
, p. 25I4..
112 Eisehhox/er, p. 1+2+1.
113 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscen-




out the war was never deflected and may represent the major
cause of the Americans' apparent ambivalence to Soviet en-
try. Charles Bohlen describes this concern aptly. "Roose-
velt's one reason for seeking Soviet entry into the Asian
war was to save the hundreds of thousands of American lives
his military experts estimated would otherwise be lost." ^
If any theme flows continuously through these three mili-
tary decision-making processes, the paramount concern for
American lives as a motivating force underlying the ration-
ale for all plans does, and it may be considered further
the most tangible thread of America's moralist foreign
policy.
^ Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 195-196.
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The American Foreign Policy Tradition Revised
This paper has examined the salient historiographic
detail surrounding three crucial, great power decisions
of World War II: the cross-Channel invasion in Europe a-
gainst Germany, the Allied drive toward Berlin, and Soviet
entry into the Pacific war against Japan. In comparison
to the classic U. S. cold war warrior position of coopera-
tion-turned-containment, I classify my perspective as
liberal-realist, wherein the perceptions of the partici-
pants, engaged at the time in eventful decision making in
the context of world war, and influenced by the overlay of
America's moral-legal tradition, represent the compounded
determinants of what actually happened, in terms of both
cause and effect. However, the account thus far should
be balanced with a sampling of the moderate-to-radical re-
visionist perspective to accommodate the socio-economic
attitudes of the liberal critique.
In general, revisionists believe that American foreign
policy has been anything but idealistic and misguided. Rather
the United States has been "an aggressive, expansionist, and
115imperialist power," which has required continuous growth
abroad to sustain its hegemonial, economic empire. Trans-
lated into a politico-military rationale for American de-
115
"* Gerald A. Combs, ed., Nationalist, Realist, and
Radical: Three Views of American Diplomacy (New York: Har-




cisions taken during World War II, this indictment becomes
a list of "could haves," with which the U. S. might have
proceeded differently, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Thus revisionists claim that:
1. The United States could have launched the western
European front in 191\2 or 'lj.3, thereby alleviating Russia's
military burden considerably;
2. The U. S. could have recognized the Soviet claim
to a sphere of influence in eastern Europe by explicitly
exempting that area from the provisions of the Atlantic
Charter;
3. The U. S. could have helped Russia to repair its
war losses by extending a generous loan without political
strings, and by permitting extensive reparations removals
from defeated Germany;
[}.. The United States could have disarmed Soviet sus-
picions of American intent by sharing the secrets of its
i 116nuclear weapons monopoly.
In short, this argument charges that the U. S. maneu-
vered in both Europe and in Asia to maximize its military
and political positions at the expense of its postwar rival,
the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal was the sustained pre-
eminence of American capitalism, a goal whose concomitant




These issues have been the subject of extensive de-
bate among scholars, most often in terms of the primacy
or lack thereof in the economic determinist component of
revisionist theory. The question impacts upon this paper
in the context of an alternative perspective on wartime
politico-military planning and how it affected the Ameri-
can foreign policy tradition. Revisionists report the
development of a national security ideology, beginning
in World War II, which rationalized the commitment of
American military power in behalf of foreign policy goals.
Indeed, this ideology fostered a national security bureauc-
racy which defined its goals in terms of power politics
and which used military means to achieve them. World War
II thus militarized American foreign policy. As increas-
ing percentages of the national budget were expended for
national security, those agencies which were most concerned
with military affairs and foreign policy acquired commen-
surate power in decision making x^ithin the U. S. government.
Thus the military services and the State Department developed
substantially increased roles and functions during World War
II. Given Roosevelt's and Truman's great respect for and
trust in their military advisers, the integrated nature of
the JCS planning process in the later war years, and the
traditional American desire to win the war quickly, it is
easy to understand how the military acquired preeminence
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at the international wartime summits. But revisionist
x^ritings indicate that this preeminence assumed harmful
proportions for American foreign policy. They identify
the coining of the term "politico-military" as a semantic
cover for considerations which should have remained sepa-
rate, but which were combined to exploit America's power
monopoly on a global basis. An ideology was created, "which
would assure a permanent place in American foreign relations
for the military outlook, military personnel, and military
117techniques for achieving international objectives."
In the postwar period, the United States military
resolved to retain its special status in foreign policy
decision making. The military chiefs were successful in
convincing their civilian leaders of this need, which be-
came defined in terms of the American foreign policy tradi-
tion. Navy Secretary James V. Porrestal requested a report
from Ferdinand Eberstadt in 191+5 on the merits of unifying
the War and Wavy departments and of organizing for national
security. Porrestal' s stated objective was to "guarantee
that this Nation shall be able to act as a unit in terms
of its diplomacy, its military policy, its use of scien-
tific knowledge, and finally of course in its moral and
political leadership of the world." 118 The Eberstadt
117 Pfeffer, p. 61;.
118 TK'. /^Ibid., p. 65.
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Report acknowledges the perceived separation of military
from political considerations in the conduct of American
foreign policy. "Our foreign policy and military policy
were not closely related. Our history presents a record
of failures properly to relate our foreign and military
119policies and to maintain them in careful balance." The
solution, x-jhich became a unified Department of Defense
with continued separation of the individual services, all
coordinated under a National Security Council, replaced
the SWNCC and was designed "to find a means of institu-
tionalizing the relationship between those responsible for
military policy so that a proper balance will be maintained
120
without endangering civilian supremacy."
In all of this revisionists saw the problems of inter-
national relations defined in terms of national security,
wherein "force would continue to be the primary instrument
121
of American diplomacy." Domestic U. S. politics and the
economic requirements of American capitalism thus become
the prime causal factors behind American foreign policy
formation. Moreover, revisionist theory ascribes to the
119 Report to Hon. James Porrestal, Secretary of the
Navy, on Unification of the War and Navy Departments and
Postwar Organization for National Security, October 22, 19l]5»
(Washington, D. C. : Superintendent of Documents, 191^5)* p. 25.
Ibid., p. i\.(.
121 Pfeffer, pp. 58-66.
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national security bureaucracy a level of coordination and
cooperation that amounts to harmonious orchestration of
American foreign policy, through skillful manipulation of
domestic politics operating in mutual support of the econ-
omic needs of market capitalism. This argument is in many
ways simply a mirror image of the cold war warrior posi-
tion, which viewed Soviet attempts to strip Germany of
its industrial capital as a plot to exploit a vanquished
nation. Therefore, any U. S. loan to help Russia rebuild
its own devastated economy would have to be contingent
upon a show of good faith for the postwar period. In
short, Russia would have to convince domestic American
opinion that such assistance would be productive and in
line with American moral concepts. The revisionist cri-
tique sees the issue in a different light. That is, when
the United States offered the Soviet Union a reconstruc-
tion loan with political strings attached, it did so with
the intent of restricting Russia in world economic compe-
tition. America's so-called desire to spare Germany from
economic death was in reality a case of self-interest where-
122in Germany represented a potentially large, postwar market.
Yet it seem3 that, in their dependence on a narrow economic
122 Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpreta-
tion of Gold V/ar Origins," in Donald Fleming and Bernard






determinism as the primary criterion underlying American
foreign policy, and on the use of military force to imple-
ment political aims in support of this basic theory, the
revisionists have given an important supporting element
an undeservedly and unsubstantiated primary role. The
domestic collusion, which they cite in evidence, both
militarily and politically, can be understood better as
competitive jockeying for popular support of American
foreign policy than as a coordinated machinery for propa-
gandizing America's need for economic hegemony. It was
also cast in terms which were supportive of and derived
strength from the American tradition. Thus, while re-
visionist theory has raised issues very worthy of con-
sideration, its rationale has been inconclusive in terms
of answering the questions which this paper asks. The al-
ternatives which it poses for politico-military decision
making during World War II are no less subject to criticism




American foreign policy has a complex tradition which
is portrayed alternatively by realists as defined by power-
political considerations of the international system, and
by revisionists as a structure based primarily upon the
needs of a hegemonial market capitalism. Overlaying both
views is a strong moralist cast, wherein American foreign
policy accepts the notion of democratic ideals as its guid-
ing force and justification. Thus, whether realist or re-
visionist in perspective, the transcendent thesis of Ameri-
can politico-military involvement during World War II in-
cluded a moral imperative superimposed upon a perceived
national security need, military or economic. This is cited
as "the original design for an international order based on
the United Nations and the Big Three, a design shattered by
123the onset of the Gold War." The desires of President
Roosevelt for a stable and permanent world peace, insured
primarily by the great powers, remains a fundamental part
of American foreign policy, whether it is interpreted as
internationalist or neo-isolationist . The moralist overlay
was explicit in the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, con-
tinued through the Korea and Vietnam wars, and is implicit
123
"* Robert E. Osgood et al., Retreat From Empire?: The
First Nixon Administration- America and the World Vol. 2.
(Baltimore: johns Hopkins, 1973) > P» 20.'
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in the so-called Nixon Doctrine today. It represents a con-
tinuum for the roots of American policy.
Since Woodrow Wilson's presidency, the right to self-
determination of the free peoples of the world has become
coterminous with the national security interests of the
United States. Each time the U. S. has decided to inter-
vene in world politics, a necessary part of the decision
to intervene has been a perceived moral need which rein-
forced the basic issue of national security. In this con-
text, world order becomes identified with American security
as an undifferentiated whole, whose one part cannot be
threatened without threatening the entirety. ^ In short,
nation-states are interdependent and their interaction is
subsumed under a universal moral law. Therefore, what is
good for one nation is also good for the world of nations. **
American foreign policy planning during World War II for
the postwar period called for remaking the world in accord-
ance with a moral-legal structure, and then regulabing its
basically "free" operation via an international organization
of united nations. The great powers, Britain, the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China would act as control
agents until the United Nations peace-keeping organization
" Robert W. Tucker, "The American Outlook: Change and
Continuity," in Osgood, America and the World, Vol. 2., pp. 3^-39.
125 Frederick S. Dunn, Peacemaking and the Se ttlement with
Japan (Princeton: Princeton University, 1963) > pp. 9-10.
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was in. full operation, whereafter "moral norms would re-
place power politics." " Implicit in such plans was the
persistent American assumption that the Soviet Union would
continue to act in concert with the other great pox^ers in
the postwar period. But even more basic to the conduct
of American foreign policy was the moral linkage betxveen
our national security and global security. Rejecting
balances of power and spheres of influence, the United
States opted to integrate national and global security
through an international peace-keeping organization which
would be supported in great part by large doses of bi-
lateral, U. S. foreign aid and U. S. -dominant, lopsided
alliances, both directed at the containment of a spheres-
127
of-influence -seeking communism. The American realiza-
tion of the shift from U. S. -Soviet wartime cooperation to
postwar competition required only a change in method, not
in substance, so far as American foreign policy principles
were concerned. The United States still adhered to its
moral obligation to make the world safe for democracy.
The fact that the enemy was no longer the Axis, but now
the Communist powers, did not really change the foundation
of American policy.
126 Ibid., pp. 18-21.
127 Ibid., pp. k$'k9.
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The politico-military plans so carefully laid doxvn at
the World War II summits began to crumble in Europe and in
Asia when both the communist Party of the Soviet Union and
the Chinese Communist Party did not behave as expected.
In eastern Europe, the political promises of Teheran and
Yalta were blatantly disregarded from the American per-
spective. Promises of free and impartial elections, and
of equitable territorial settlements as quid pro quos for
western Allied concessions all came to naught. It became
increasingly difficult to ignore the rise of a Soviet
sphere of influence throughout eastern Europe. In Asia,
the predictions of discredited U. S. officials came true,
even if not exactly for the reasons predicted. The CCP
proved an exceptionally viable political and military
force, while the KMT lost ground on both levels and in
every quarter. During the war years, the American deci-
sions to press for unconditional surrender from both Ger-
many and Japan represented a reversal of the rational order
of political ends and military means. In part this was
attributable to the so-called American propensity for di-
vorcing diplomacy from military power. But this is not
a sufficient reason. It was also due to the moralist na-
ture of American foreign policy which, in total war, had




its use of force. As the military efforts approached
their unanticipated political conclusions, this means-
end imbalance continued to cause problems for American
decision makers, who found themselves unwilling and un-
able "to use military power purposefully to achieve po-
litical objectives," or "to abandon unattainable goals
129in order to avoid entanglement in a hopeless cause."
The moralist component of American foreign policy im-
mobilized the normal interaction of political, military,
and economic aspects which would have been otherwise
quite inseparable, especially over the long term. The
ultimate American decisions and their results can be
construed as an unwillingness to pay the military price
which was necessary to achieve its political objectives.
That is, the policy of seeking victory as soon as pos-
sible and the attendant demand for unconditional surren-
der were believed to be the most important as well as
moral way of conducting a war. "Get in and get out fast"
became the watchwords. The urge to bring American mili-
tary personnel home quickly overrode political considera-
tions and made the issues academic, if still morally tinged.
Given this moralist cast and the relative politico-military
positions of the great powers in 19l\S f it is likely that no
129 Ibid., pp. ix-xi.
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matter what the United States might have done, politically,
militarily, or economically, it could only have postponed,
130but could not have averted, the final outcome. -'
Over a century ago, Walter Bagehot wrote in The English
Constitution (1867) that "Nations touch at their summits."
The Grand Alliance of World War II epitomized this con-
cept in the context of decisions taken by the great powers
at Teheran and Yalta. It is unlikely and perhaps undesir-
able that debate over the military and political inter-
relations emanating from those summit conferences will
ever cease. They have been researched from many points
of view. This paper has sought to critically examine why
military decision making rose to a position of political
preeminence. The sources are virtually limitless, and the
modest sampling which I have completed is only a beginning.
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